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JUNK SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENTAL RISK, AND VERY LOW DETECTION LEVELS IN NPDES
PERMITS
Todd B. Adams & Barry Michael Levine"
The dangers of "junk science'" have dominated recent legal discussion about scientific evidence inside2 and
outside the courtroom. This emphasis on the dangers of poor science extends to dischargers emphasizing the dangers of
being unfairly penalized because of improper measurement of pollutants in the air, water and ground.4 Under the Clean
Water Act., the U.S. Environmental Protection ("EPA") has drawn one reasonable compromise between protecting the
environment and unfairly penalizing dischargers. Recognizing the policy choices6 inherent within the measurement
process justifies, however, a more environmentally protective approach than currently used by EPA.
I. INTRODUCTION TO TRACE POLLUTANTS AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT
The Clean Water Act regulates the discharge of pollutants to the navigable waters of the United States. It
prohibits the discharge of a pollutant from a "point source" into the "navigable waters of the U.S." except in compliance
with a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.' Depending upon the pollutant, the Clean
Water Act requires technology based effluent limits8 and effluent limits based on water quality standards.9 Dischargers
discharging toxic pollutants like PCBs must meet stringent effluent standards based on water quality standards.'o The
States establish the water quality standards necessary to protect the environment." The States then incorporate a water
quality based effluent limit ("WQBEL") in the relevant NPDES permit.'2 Science then must determine whether it can
reliably detect or quantify" the chemical of interest at the WQBEL.
Academic Specialist, Michigan State University. Eli Broad College of Business. J.D., 1984. University of Michigan. I wish to thank Bob Avery,
Ph.D.. Kathleen Brewer. Amy Cook. Bill Creal. Hector Galbraith. Ph.D.. Carol Smith. Terry Walkington, and Lisa Williams, Ph.D. who have helped
me understand as much of environmental science as I do. Any errors. of course. are mine alone. Thecpinians.expressed herein reflect solely those
of the authors and not any other institution or person. including Michigan State University. the MichiganDepartnendfAttormey General and the
State of Michigan.
Partner. Braun KendrickFinkbeiner. Ph.D., University of Michigan 1993: J.D.. Emouy University, [983.
c"Junk S ience' isscience that has, little scientific credibility andl often done by "tiirrge" sciientitsm witT' few credentiidirh the rekvanit fe1d. Peter
Hober. Galileo's Revenge. Junk Science in the Cburrroon 14..(Basic Books 1991). In contrast, sciencerequisea "reptikation, verification, and peer
review. the'patientd'evetoprent of consensus the systematic weeding pruning, and uprooting of spurious data and'erroneous theory." Id. at 209.
Criticismof-'iunk seience"is notnew. "Such: is the respect paid to science that the most absurd opinions may become current, provided they are
expressedi ini language., the sound!oft which'i recaIs some well-known scientific phrase." James Clerk Maxwell, quoted in John Ziman, An
Introdhction to Sceince Studies, The Philosopliiealand/Secial'Aspects ofScience and Technology I (1984).
1fmtlir8't~efea farmnidel'.5 I~.5.lk lil9).Ct. Ff67. l43 IL.Ed2di238 (1999): Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, 509 U.S. 579,
113 S.Ct. 2786. 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993).
David L. Faigman. Legal Alchemv (1999): Kenneth R. Foster & Peter W. Huber. Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts
(1999); and Carl F. Cranor. Regulating Toxic Substances: A Philosophy ofScience and the Law (1993).
4 Steven J. Koorse. False Positives, Detection Limits, and Other Laboratory Imperfections: The Regulatory Implications, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,212,
10.215 (1989).
533 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1999).
6 Faigman labels the issue as a "legal policy" question. Faigman, Legal Alchemy at 195. and see Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic
Risk Regulation, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1613. 1617 & 1719: Rob Hoppe & Aat Peterse, Handling Frozen Fire: Political Culture and Risk Management 1
(1993).
33 U.S.C.. 1311(A).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(1)(B) & (2)(B).
933 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2). "[W]ater quality standards should. wherever attainable, provide for water quality for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish and wildlife, and for recreation. and consider and value for public water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes.
and agricultural. industrial. and other purposes. including navigation." 40 C.F.R. § 131.2.
10 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1).
33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) & 40 C.F.R. § 131.2.
2 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(1)(c). For an overview of this process. see Patton. Boggs & Blow, Environmental Law Handbook 166-179 (1994).
--Three fundamental processes characterize chemical measurements: detection, identification, and quantification." Lloyd Currie. Preface vii in
Detection in Analytical Chenisy. Importance, Theory and Practice (Lloyd Currie. ed.)(ACS Symposium Series 361)(1988) ("ACS Analytical
Chemistry"). This is analogous to using photographs from spy satellites to identify enemy tanks in a war zone. See Ziman. Reliable Knowledge at
48
MELPR, Vol. 8, No. 2
II. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF TRACE POLLUTANTS
Trace amounts of PCBs can harm fish and wildlife because of their bioaccumulative qualities, persistence in the
environment, and toxicity." Over twenty years after the U.S. banned the manufacture of PCBs15 and strictly regulated
their use,'6 PCBs still pose a danger to the environment." The water quality standard and resultant WQBEL for PCBs are
orders of magnitude below the ability of science to detect and quantify PCBs.' 8 This places a premium on understanding
the method of chemical analysis and the terms used.
A "detection level" means that the analyst knows the pollutant is there, but not at what concentration. 9 The
analyst sees PCBs.20 In contrast,2' a "quantifiable" limit is one where the analyst both knows the pollutant is present and
has some degree of confidence it is present at a specific concentration. 2 The analyst not only sees the PCBs, but also is
confident at a specified level that PCBs are present in a certain amount. A certain minimal uncertainty exists for chemical
analysis 23 of very low levels of PCBs. Noise is unavoidable.2 ' The laboratory may focus on determining whether PCBs
85-87 (photography used as an analogy). The analyst must first determine whether he or she sees something other artificial in the photograph, thenidentify it as a tank. The last stage is to count the number of tanks. Obviously clouds. camouflage, the limits of the camera's resolution and mistakes
all limit the reliability of the analyst's count of tanks in the photograph. Statistical analysis of the technique and of a particular analyst's past
performance can provide an estimate of the accuracy and reliability of any particular photographic analysis.
Science has improved the detection of both tanks and chemicals over the years. "Detection limits are constantly changing. Over the last
twenty years, engineers and chemists have worked to design instruments that can detect and quantify smaller concentrations of compounds." David
Elias & Robert C. Goodman, When Nothing Is Something: Understanding Detection Limits. 13 Natural Resources & Environment 519. 520 (1999).4 Environmental Defense Fundv. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1271-72 (D.C. Cir. 1980). The evidence that PCBs cause adverse human health effects is
more uncertain. Renate D. Kimbrough. The Human Health Effects of Polvchlorinated Biphenyls, in Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law
211-228 (Kenneth R. Foster, David E. Bernstein. & Peter W. Huber eds.)(1993).
' 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(3)(A)(i) (1999) (prohibiting the manufacture of PCBs after January 1. 1979).640 C.F.R., part 761 (1999).
7 In 1995, EPA stated "scientists and public leaders have reached a general consensus that the presence of environmentally persistent.
bioaccumulative contaminants is a serious environmental threat to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem." 60 Fed. Reg. 15.366. 15.367 (1995) (Final
Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System)("Final GLI").
i8 The current EPA ambient water criterion for PCBs in navigable waters is .001 parts per billion. 40 C.F.R. § 129.105(a)(4). In Michigan. the PCB
water quality standard for PCBs as a class is 0.000026 parts per billion. Mich. Admin. Code R. 323.1057 (Table 8: Human Cancer Values for theProtection of Human Health). This value becomes the WQBEL in the NPDES permit. Id at 1211(1). Science can currently detect PCBs. however,
only t much higher levels. Elias & Goodman, When Nothing Is Something: Understanding Detection Limits, 13 Nat. Res. & Env. at 519.
9 EPA defines the "Method Detection Limit" ("MDL") as "the minimum concentration of a substance that can be measured and reported with 99%
confidence that the analyte concentration is greater than zero." 40 C.F.R., Part 136, appendix B.
An analyst must recognize the pattern of PCBs spikes on a gas chromatograph by comparing the chromatograph of the sample with established
chromatographs of PCBs. 40 C.F.R., Part 136, Appendix A. Method 608: see. for example. id. at figures 4-10 (PCB chromatographs). If the pattern
matches, then the analyst has found PCBs. Id. at § 12.5. Comparison of analytical results to a standard is common in science. John Ziman, Reliable
Knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science, 43 (1978).
Actually performing the analysis is, of course, much more difficult. A laboratory must prepare a sample for analysis in order to reduce
confounding noise from chemicals other than the one for which the sample is being analyzed. 40 C.F.R.. Part 136. Appendix A. Method 608, §§ 2.2& 3. The laboratory then calibrates its gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer ("GS/MC") prior by analyzing samples or "standards" with knownlevels of PCBs and provided by sources external to the laboratory. Id. at § 7.2. In technical language, "[c]alibration is the establishment of aquantitative relationship between the response of the analytical procedure and the concentration of the target analyte." Berger, EnvironmentalLaboratory Data Evaluation at 2-4. If the analytical results meet certain statistically based standards, then the laboratory proceeds to analyze the
samples with unknown levels of PCBs. After running the sample through the GC/MS, an analyst then examines the chromatographs of the unknown
sample to determine whether PCBs were present or "detected" in the sample and then to quantify the level of PCBs. 40 C.F.R.. Part 136. AppendixA. Method 608, §§ 12 & 13. If the laboratory analyst recognizes a PCB pattern in the sample without being able to quantify the level of PCBsbecause the PCB level is below the level for which the particular GC/MS is calibrated, then the laboratory analyst -"detects- PCBs. See id. at § 13.3("Quantitate every individual peak unless interference persists after cleanup.").21 The term "detection" has been used in quantifiable limits causing linguistic confusion. Lloyd Currie. the editor of the American Chemical Society'sDetection in Analytical Chemistry, has written: "We have noted that detection limits dictated by regulatory concerns have been surrounded by
considerable confusion, discrepant statistical and ad hoc formulations. ignorance. and even mild deception.'22 For example, EPA has followed the American Chemical Society and defined the "Limit of Quantitation" as "the concentration above whichquantitative results can be obtained with a specific degree of confidence." 64 Fed. Reg. 30.417, 30.425 (1999). EPA has promulgated quantifiable
"Minimum Levels" ("ML") and a method for determining quantifiable "Interim Minimum Levels" ("IMI"). Water Quality Guidance for the GreatLakes System. Supplementary Information Document ("SID"). 419-20 (EPA March 1995).23 _It is a commonplace of elementary scientific method that every experimental result is subject to some degree of uncertainty.... It is afundamental principle of statistics that a phenomenon that occurs, say. once in a million trials on the average will not be observed once every milliontrials. The results of any experiment that runs for a finite time (e.g. to collect and analyze ten million photographs) are thus subject to significant
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are present instead of determining the precise level of PCBs.25 Theoretical uncertainties limit the certainty of any
analytical result.26 Errors in collecting and handling the evidence will increase error rates further."27 Preparing a sample
for analysis may affect the results.28 Confirmation bias, when the analyst finds PCBs because the analyst expects or wants
to find PCBs in a sample, is also a danger.29 Even the most gifted analyst will make mistakes.30 The individual analyst
should, therefore, "minimize, but not to underrate, the noise in the data."3' The political and legal communities can then
decide what to do with the data.32
Ill. STATISTICS & ANALYTICAL CHEMISTRY
A. Significance Testing and Confidence Intervals
Mistakes and the unavoidable uncertainties of chemical analysis means that perfect proof does not exist in science
any more than it exists in the law. In science, statistics are used to describe errors and to help control them.33 Scientists
and regulators use statistics to define "detection level" and "quantification levels" in analytical chemistry.34 Both
definitions require a certain level of statistical certainty that requires some explanation. There is no one definition of
statistical certainty in science." For one thing, there are many ways to describe a group of analytical results or other
data. Furthermore, if not understood or incompletely presented, statistics can be misleading.
statistical fluctuations and can never be precisely reproduced from one experimental run to the! next" Ziman, Reliable Knowledge at 64-65, and see
also Crumme'ts. ACSAnalvtical Chewuisv at 293-4 (commenrts,)L
a Noise is especially troublesome when scientists seek to observ very small effets. ZimanL Rhliable Knowledge at 67. Ziman gives the following
example about the use ofa large aluminum cylinder to detect and measure gravity waves. "The vibrations oftcriseylinder [designed to detect gravity
waves] were then recorded by instruments so sensitive that they could detect length variations of'the order ofone-rillianth ofthe diameter of a single
atom. Naturally. the observed output of this apparatus is fluctuating 'noise due to innumerable small r ES thati could not be completely
screened out. Thus, the question whether any particular wiggle might be due to the passing of a gravitational wave thriug the antenna cannot be
decided by mere inspection of the record." Id. Foster and Huber give a less esoteric example. "A simple example of such a question would be the
claim thata gasoline additive can improve a car's mileage by a millionth ofa mile (about a thirtieth ofan inch) per gallon. The claim is scientific in
Popper's sense. but it.isn't scientific in the world of real engines, real tires, and real roads-in practice, the experimental errors are far larger than the
claimed effect.- Foster and Flubes. Judging Science at 55.
z5"[TJhe trade-offbetween sensiiivity andispecificity Iisl; inherent in test systems.' I Zwieg, M, "Establishing Clinical Detection Limits of
Laboratory Tests." ACS Analvtical Chemistry at 151. Zweig uses the example of early radar systems to demonstrate this point. A very sensitive
radar system will warn the operator of almost all incoming planes but it will also warn the operator of incoming birds. Id _ A radar system set to
avoid almost all misidentifications of birds as planes will, however, also not detect some incoming planes. Id. If the incoming planes are enemy
bombers. the consequences are severe for the defenders. The tragic downing of an Iraqi airliner by an U.S. naval vessel demonstrates these dangers.
26 "The raw data must be refined, processed, analyzed and interpreted by each research worker in his own laboratory, before they can be made
sufficiently compact and sufficiently interesting, for onward transmission. These processes are, themselves, heavily laden with theory, and deeply
embedded in the current scheme of thought." Ziman, Reliable Knowledge at 70.
7 See Foster & Huber. Judging Science at 95 (DNA).
28 The techniques used to separate the desired signal from the noise are very important in highly instrumented science, and cannot be ignored in any
assessment of the ultimate reliability of scientific knowledge . . . . Ziman. Reliable Knowledge at 66. "But these techniques may not be so efficient
when we look for a signal that may not be there at all . . . . In very sensitive instruments the experimental uncertainties can take on an active role ....
In very sensitive instruments the unavoidable and errors of observation are magnified into an apparently autonomous random disturbance, impishly
impeding the honest search for truth. Id
29 "This phenomenon is called confirmation bias. Sometimes confirmation bias may lead to egregious miscarriages ofjustice-when a detective, for
example. fails to collect potentially exculpatory evidence about a suspect. Scientists can easily fall into similar traps, collecting easy results that
support what is already believed rather than doing hard analysis that might contradict accepted truths." Foster & Huber, Judging Science at 45
(emphasis in original).
30 "[O]ur main point here is to notice the uncertainties and errors that can accompany good experimental technique by highly competent research
workers, and the necessity of independent replication and verification ifwe are to acquire reliable/ empirical knowledge concerning the external
world." Ziman. Reliable Knowledge at 75-76.
3 1 Id at 70.
3 Ziman. Introduction to the Study ofScience at 178-180.
" See Caulcutt & Boddy. Statistical Analysis for Chemists at 1-4 (description of meaning and uses of statistics in analytical chemistry).
3 4 See supra notes 18 & 19.
35 -Scientists constantly argue over the criteria for rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e.. for concluding that there is a real difference between the groups
being compared). Foster & Huber. Judging Science at 77-
36 Caulcott & Boddy. Statistical. Analysis for Chemists at 1-2.
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Scientists may use significance tests in evaluating analytical data. "The purpose of a significance test is to draw a
conclusion about a population using data from a sample."38 For example, an analyst determines that six samples have a
mean of x when the true value of the solution from which the samples were drawn was y. If the difference between x and
y is large enough, then a significance test might show that chance would result in such a difference only 1% or 5% of the
time. Use of a confidence interval also provides useful information. A confidence interval consists of an interval
centered on the sample mean with a confidence level. 40 In less technical language, it is a range interval that covers the
true value of the pollutant in the pollution a specified percentage of the time.41 In the example above, a confidence
interval would be that a person is 95% or 99% confident that the analyst's bias lies between x plus or minus some value
z.42 Political pollsters use this familiar format to report their results. Both statistical significance tests and confidence
intervals can provide useful information about the reliability of data. Statistics also provides further useful information
for the legal and regulatory system.43
B. False Positives Versus False Negatives
"False positives" and "false negatives" are by now familiar scientific jargon. In the context of detecting and
quantifying trace pollutants, false positives are finding the trace pollutant where it is not or at least not above the
WQBEL.44 False negatives are not finding the trace pollutant above the WQBEL where it is above the WQBEL. 45 False
negatives and false positives have, of course, different consequences for the environment and dischargers. This means
that setting a compliance level requires a policy judgment on how to balance the risk of finding the trace pollutant where
there is none. False positives entail risk to both dischargers and environmentalists. Dischargers, of course, have a vital
interest in the measurement of PCBs and other trace pollutants. Finding PCBs where there are none can trigger the
expenditure of millions of dollars in control equipment46 and possibly require the involved discharger to pay fines.4 1
Environmentalists also have a stake in the money spent in the form of lost opportunity costs. Money spent
unnecessarily to stop PCB pollution cannot be spent on stopping other pollution." Even money spent unnecessarily
"Id.
' Id. at 34.
3 "Most scientists require that the difference between control and exposed groups in a study be 'statistically significant' at the p = 0.05 level. This
means that there is a probability of less than 5 percent-according to the statistical tests used-that the investigators would have recorded a
difference as large in the sample if the populations from which the groups were drawn were the same with respect to the properties being compared.
A difference that is statistically significant has a low probability of being a statistical fluke: the two populations probably are different." Foster &
Huber, Reliable Knowledge at 77. See also, Caulcott & Boddy, Statistical Analysis for Chemists at 33-35. "In most scientific work . . . .05 or 5%.
The probability that the null hypothesis will be rejected incorrectly, assuming the null hypothesis is true ... while . . . the 5 % criterion is typical.
reporting of more stringent 1% significance tests or less significant 10% tests can also provide useful information." Daniel L. Rubinfeld. "Reference
Guide on Multiple Regression," in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 415. 431 (Federal Judicial Institute. 1990)(multiple regression analysis).
40 Caulcott & Boddy, Statistical Analysis for Chemists at 38.
41 David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman. "Reference Guide on Statistics," in Reference Manual, 331. 396.42 Caulcott & Boddy, Statistical Analysis for Chemists at 3 8-39.
4 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 ("[T]he court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error.")
4 See Foster & Huber, Judging Science at 75-76 (false negatives and false positives in general).
45 Id.
46 The issue of false positives permeates environmental law.
47 These dangers may have been overstated. "The apparent deception [resulting from the misuse of the term detection] is related to the lack of
general understanding or agreement concerning the appropriate nature and magnitude of the error of the second kind ( . . . false negative). By
ignoring its presence, whether intentional or not, those who must meet regulatory demands generate a [false positive/false negativel imbalance where
... false negatives may exceed false positives by nearly a factor of 400." Currie, Detection: Overview of Historical. Societal and Technical Issues, in
ACSAnalytical Chemistry in 38. Emphasizing the danger of petitioners being unjustly fined ("false positive") to the exclusion of the danger of
petitioners discharging injurious pollutants without being discovered ("false negative") is incorrect. "False-negatives, a particular concern of public
health authorities and regulators. may indicate that a health-based water quality standard has been met when in fact it has been exceeded." William
M. Draper. et al., 90 J Am. Water Works Assn 82. 83 (June 1998).
4s Foster and Huber provide an example of lost opportunity costs in controlling radon. "If EPA's numbers are right [that radon causes 20.000 excess
lung cancer deaths every year]. radon is one of the most serious environmental health threats in the country. But studies in counties with high radon
levels have consistently failed to find any direct evidence of excess deaths from radon. Billions of dollars of remediation expenditures thus ride on a
presumed effect too small to detect with any scientific and statistical tools currently available." Foster & Huber, Judging Science at 57 (note
omitted).
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measuring PCBs causes lost opportunity costs for controlling PCBs or other pollutants.49 Setting compliance levels for
trace pollutants that cause environmental damage below levels of reliable measurement requires a policy decision about
the relative dangers of false positives and false negatives. Those dangers cannot be evaluated in the abstract.
C. Base Rates
More than the error rate inherent to the test affects the likelihood of a particular erroneous analytical result being a
false positive or a false negative. The true ratio of violations to non-violations, known as the base rate, may significantly
affect the ratio of false positives to false negatives in compliance monitoring. Most simply stated, if violations occur very
rarely, 0 then the likelihood that any particular erroneous result will be a false positive instead of a false negative
dramatically increase.51 In the abstract, a thousand samples would. have 25 false-positives and 25 false negatives at the
95% confidence level. If the true rate of compliance was98%, howereni then the ratio changes. Of the 980 times the
plant complies, there will be about 49 false positives.7 Ofthe20 times the plant violated the standard, there would be I
false negative.53 Of the 58 violationsfoundtaterT%.ofstierrr would be incorrect.54 If the test has a 99% confidence
level of correctly findnig cornplHacearrdalso ab.n-ectily findingnon-compliance, however,the ratio is about 10 false
positives outtof 30 violations.5 Base rates powerfirfl'y affect the ratio of false positives to false negatives. Any
regulatory approach should take base rates into account in some manner.
IV. THE REGULATORY APPROACH
Determining the proper regulatory approach for PCBs and other trace pollutants that are environmentally harmful
at levels that cannot be reliably measure is obviously difficult. EPA has established a reasonable regulatory approach that
balances the danger to the environment with the rights of dischargers.
A. Determining a Reasonable Potential That the Discharge Will Contain the Pollutant
The previous diiscussion shows that false posi-ives may, adversey impat dischargers and to a lesseE extent the
environne nL EPA uegudation;s mminimize the danger of fase positives by requising compliance wih a WQBEL onlly for
poiltitants that knave a "reasonable poteniialF to be discharged.. The discharger musit submit a fact sheet csocesing the
pnopised disdhange at the beginning of the NFDES pemi proces. From this fact sheet and atleir ifrain the
penithrg autroay wmust detumine wheheher t=ee is a "easmalre pottdial to cause, or cotrrtibute to am excursion"
beyowad enviiummentlly protective icsels.) Ifthere is, then the permitting authority must include a WQBEL.60 This
ensures trot only that the discharger will not waste resources testing for substances probably not present but also those
49
'American Iron and!Sieel Institute v. EPA, 1ll15f.3d!991. 004t(D.C. Cii. 1997) (per curiam). "It is all very well to insist that we should go on
taking pictures [measurements]iuntil the case is proved 'beyond'peradventure' (whatever that means!). Such perfection may cost enormously in
money. and in time. The aim of the research is to produce a publishable scientific result, of adequate plausibility, not complete proof." John Ziman,
Reliable Knowledge: An exploration of the grounds for belief in science 65 (1978).
5o "Tests, even quite good ones, will yield unreliable results-far less reliable than intuition suggests-if used to screen for rare events." Foster &
Huber, Judging Science at 119.
51 -Predictive value clearly depends on both the qualities of the test itself (sensitivity and specificity) and the base rate. The predictive value is the
ratio of true positives (individuals who test positive and who really are infected. for example) to the total number of people who test positive, whether
correctly or incorrectly." Foster & Huber, Judging Science at 115.
2 980 x .05 = 49.
5" 20 x .05 - 1.
5 49/68 = .73.
5s 980 x .01 = 9.8 false positives. There would be a .2 chance of a false negative.
20 x.01 =. 2.
56 Assuming that all 20 of the times that the plant violated the compliance limit were detected.
" 40 C.F.R., Part 132. Appendix F. Procedure 5 (for the Great Lakes System). For an overview of the NPDES Process. see Patton, Boggs & Blow,
Environmental Law Handbook at 166-179.
58 This includes monitoring information but also any -valid. relevant, representative information.' 40 C.F.R., Part 132, Appendix F. procedure 8.
such as intake pollutants. existing controls and sources of the pollutant. Id. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.44(d)(ii) & 122.45(h)(2).
' 40 C.F.R.. Part 132. Appendix F. at Procedure 8 (Great Lakes Basin).6040 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(i).
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false positives will not result in fines. After all, if an analyst takes enough samples, there will be false positives even
without confirmation bias. 6' Ensuring that a reasonable potential exists for the discharge of the pollutant reduces the
possibility of a false positive.
B. Protecting the Discharger by Reducing False Positives Under the EPA Regulations.
Seeing PCBs at the detection level only means that PCBs are present in the sample. It provides no reliable
information about the concentration of PCBs in the sample.62 On the other hand, seeing PCBs at the quantification level
provides reliable information about the concentration of PCBs in the sample and, therefore, about whether the WQBEL is
violated. Accordingly, EPA has promulgated rules to protect dischargers from false positives associated with the
detection level.
Where the WQBEL is too low to reliably measure, EPA makes a violation of the quantification level-and not of
the detection level-a violation of the permit. "When a WQBEL is below the [quantifiable] ML., one cannot make a
definitive statement as to whether or not the concentration of the pollutant in the effluent is above or V2 below the
WQBEL." 63 EPA explicitly rejected use of the detection level in order to protect dischargers from false positives. "EPA
rejected the use of the MDL and other non-quantifiable concentration levels because these concentrations, by definition,
do not represent concentrations that are both reproducible and quantifiable indicators of the actual concentration of a
given sample, and hence are not reliable measures for permit compliance purposes."6 4 EPA has also left discretion for the
permitting authority to determine the confidence level necessary to establish a violation.65 This allows the permitting
authority to take into consideration other evidence of a violation and issues of base rates.
C. Pollutant Minimization Plan
Compliance with a quantification limit above the WQBEL does not protect the environment. In such
circumstances, EPA requires dischargers to institute a pollutant minimization plan (",PMP"). 66 The goal of a PMP is "to
maintain the effluent at or below the WQBEL."6  The PMP requires monitoring, submission ofa control strategy, and
"implementation of appropriate, cost-effective control measures." 68 EPA has fully protected the rights of dischargers in
its regulations through use of the quantification level. It has also protected the environment through requiring pollutant
minimization plans when the WQBEL cannot be reliably measured. As discussed below, however, EPA can take further
regulatory steps to protect the environment without unfairly penalizing dischargers.
V. SCIENCE AND THE LEGAL BURDENS OF PROOF
EPA has established a reasonable regulatory approach for trace pollutants such as PCBs that cause environmental
damage below levels of reliable measurement. Placing analytical results back in context supports, however, a more
environmentally protective approach without unjustly penalizing dischargers.
A. The Scientific and Legal Processes are More Similar than Often Thought
Much of the recent literature emphasizes the difference between the scientific process and the legal process to the
detriment of the legal process.69 The literature sometimes underestimates, however, the effectiveness of the adversary
61 See supra section IlI.B.
62 See supra notes 18 & 19.
6 58 Fed. Reg. 20,802. 20.978 (1993) (Proposed GLI).
6 SID at 419.
65 American Iron and Steel Institute, 115 F.3d at 994.
6 40 C.F.R., Part 132. appendix F. procedure 8.D. (for Great Lakes System).67 id.6
s Id at 8.D.1-6.
69 Jasanoff Science at the Bar: Law Science, and Technology in America at 5-6. For example. the writers of one article stated: -Apparently. at the
level at which a scientist might barely entertain an argument. the lawyer will convict a criminal defendant beyond a reasonable doubt." Walter NI.
Gawlak & Daniel M. Byrd. Divergent approaches to Uncertaintv in Risk Assessment: .11athematical Expression compared to Circumstantial
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system 70 and the similarities between the legal and scientific system. "[T]here are important differences between the quest
for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory."' In particular, "[s]cientific conclusions are subject to
perpetual revision" while legal disputes must be "resolve[d] . . . finally and quickly." 2 This difference is indisputable
when comparing science as a philosophical endeavor to find the truth to law as a dispute resolution mechanism. Others
draw a sharp philosophical distinction: "[S]cience seeks truth, while the law does justice; science is descriptive, but the
law is prescriptive: science emphasizes progress, whereas the law emphasizes process."7 3 Replication, verification, peer74
review, and the patient development of consensus almost completely separate science from the law for some.
These differences are less acute and there significance for the courtroom less apparent, however, when we
compare both science and the law as philosophical endeavors " and science and the law as practical endeavors. 6
Philosophically, the law no less than science seeks the truth because individual justice fundamentally depends on finding
the correct facts.7 The law relies on logic and evidence in seeking justice . Furthermore, if the law is not viewed as a
single case, but as a process, law is self-correcting to some degree over the long term. Legal rules that do not work and
bad decisions are abandoned.
Unlike science, the law cannot usually rely on the precision of mathematics or consensus to resolve issues, but
this makes the law more difficult without distinguishing it in kind. Aesthetics, history, and cultural needs shape scienceso
as much as they do the law. Scientific authority, just like legal authority, may partially arise from chance8' and inhibit
new ideas.82 Science as much as the law may be an endless process.83 Second and more importantly for purposes of this
paper, science in practice has the same difficulties as law in practice. It is impossible to "wring the last drops of
uncertainty from what scientists call their knowledge. . . . [B]oth as individual scientists and historically, is that we only
arrive at partial and incomplete truths."84 Time may constrain science less than the law,85 but individual scientists, like
any other human being, face time and monetary constraints. Not are scientists immune from human failings.86 "Theories
... shape perception."" Emotions can powerfully affect scientific theories.88 Even the greatest scientist is not a
Evidence, in Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and Decision Making, 39, 43 (Vincent T. Covello. Lester B. Lave. Alan Moghissi,
and V.R.R. Uppuluri, eds. 1987).
70 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
n Id. at 596-597.
72 Id at 597.
7 Jasanoff. Science arithe Bar. 7 (characterizing the criticism of the law)!
74See supra note 1I.
TJamsadl Scienew as tde &ar- at 8L
.'~Theap pmuchi 1 take here assumes the cntras [to seience isan' autonomous aud lbsgelly self-regnlating loeitlefinqpi]j tattsientirfu llafims,
especiialyotheosetliat are implicated!iio. lbga contmoversiesm are tighiy eontestedt contingent on particular-lboinkedlefacumatanci. andiffreilited with
burindipresumpionsabouttthesouillwdrdi~lin! whihe thev aredkpliubyedl ld at siax.
" aSanff argus th lttelbowalse seeksite estahils ffiets oectly. but on asianiadjunct to its transcendent objectiveof settling disputes fairly
audeficiently:. It. at9.. Whifi itisithuethatthe count6 smetiimmuignores probatirve evidence. especially'in criminal proceedings, in order to serve
tc at 10. this is an overstatement. Most people would agree that
finding the truth is a key to doing justice.
7
nAmerican Iron and Steel Institute. 115 F.3d at 1005 (model cannot be arbitrary).
79 This is true with regard to science. See Williami W. Scwarzer. "Management of Expert Evidence," Reference Manual, 15 (comparing "mature
torts"% with developing torts.). This point has been made more generally as well. Benjamin N. Cardozo. The Nature ofthe Judicial Process, 178-179
(1921).
80 Ziman. An Introduction to Science Studies at 191-2.
" Id at 77 (1984) ('<the Matthew effect- of lucky" early success substantially contributing to later success).
82 Id. at 79. & see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 ("[Petitioners] suggest that recognition of a screening role for the judge that allows for the exclusion of
'invalid' evidence will sanction a stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy and will be inimical to the search for truth.").
' Karl R. Popper. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth ofScientific Knowledge at 6 (1963).
4 J.M. Ziman. Public Knowledge: An Essay Concerning the Social Dimension ofScience, 5 (1968) & Wagner. The Scientific Charade, 95 Colum. L.
Rev. at 663.
85 Jasanoff. Science at the Bar at 9.
86 ~Sophisticated equipment and training don't guarantee that subjectivity and self-deception won't creep into an experiment. Nor is there any
auarantee that a substantial fraction of the scientific community may not. for a time. be taken in as well." Alan Cromer. Uncommon Sense: The
Heretical Nature ofScience, 171 (1993).
87 Bert Black. A Unified Theory ofScientific Evidence. 56 Fordham L. Rev. 595. 619 (1988).
1 See. for example. Stephen Jay Gould. The Aismeasure of Man, passim (1996) (how racism affected research into human physiology and
intelligence).
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completely disinterested observer reasoning from pure facts. Sharp philosophical distinctions between science and
science and the law seem, therefore, unjustified from a philosophical and a practical perspective. If "junk science" poses a
danger in the measurement of pollutants or in the courtroom generally, the main causes would seem to lie elsewhere.
B. Science and Law as Historical Endeavors.
Science and the law appear remarkably similar when trying to do the same thing: understand past events. This
suggests that the most important problem with "junk science" is the law's perceived inability to properly evaluate
scientific evidence and the burden of proof. Science and the law can appear remarkably similar when trying to understand
past events. Science has carefully sought out facts and constructed theories about why the Titanic sank over 80 years ago.
Access to the shipwrecks and computer modeling have brought the answer closer without resolving the mystery. Nor has
science been able to answer conclusively why certain airliners crashed. Absent a change in the laws of nature90 and a
change in morality about experimenting on human subjects where the subjects run an avoidable risk of injury or death,9'
science cannot finally answer eliminate all uncertainty any more than the law can.
The law's perceived inability to properly evaluate scientific evidence rests on two solid grounds. First,juries and
courts often do not have enough scientific knowledge to understand and discriminate between competing scientific
theories.92 Modem science and statistics often tend toward the impenetrable. A court need not understand, however,
every nuance of a scientific dispute. It need only understand enough to make a reasonable decision.94 This is, of course,
by no means an easy task.95 Education and the use of special masters are two tried and obvious ways to help courts
evaluate scientific evidence. Unless science is to remain a "black box" accessible only to a scientific elite despite its
importance and implications,97 then judges and juries will have to muddle their way through as best they can.98 Second,
the burdens of proof differ between science and the law." Science disproves a "null hypothesis" with more or less
certainty.'to A scientific theory gains acceptance by eliminating competing explanations, providing a convincing
explanation, and usually by providing testable hypothesis that distinguish it from the competing explanations.'0 Science
89 Gerald Holton, Einstein, History, and Other Passions, 58-61 (1996) (describing Einstein's apparently erroneous reliance on his '-little finger for
rejecting "the fundamentality of probabilism in physics"); & Kurt Hubner. Critique ofScientific Reason, 51-71 (1983).
9 Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History, 287 (1987) (alternate versions of history only possible in the
movies)).
91 See Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science. 6 (1966) (experiments in 1800s to determine the cause of puerperal fever that would be
regarded as criminal today).
92 Jasanoff, Science at the Bar at 5-7. "The courts do not have the institutional resources to be statisticians." D.H. Kaye. 'Ruminations on
Jurimetrics: Hypergeometiric Confusion in the Fifth Circuit, " 26 Jurimetrics J., 215, 222 (1986).
9 In Re: TMILitigation, 193 F.3d 613, 628 (3d Cir. 1999).
9 See id. at 727, n. 179 (reliance on common sense), but see, Wagner, The Scientific Charade, 95 Colum. L. Rev.. 1717 (most judges admit
"scientific incompetence").
9s The TMI Court needed over 25 pages to do so. In Re: TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d at 628-655.
9 See William W. Schwarzer, "Managing Expert Evidence," in Reference Manual, 16 (how judge should approach scientific evidence): Joe S. Cecil
and Thomas E. Willinger, "Court Appointed Experts." id at 525: and Margeret G. Farrell. "Special Masters, " Id at 575.
9 Jasanoff, Science at the Bar, 232, & Ziman, Teaching and Learning about Science and Society, 53 (1980). Ziman. An Introduction to Science
Studies at 160-61 & 190.
98 "[Courts] reasoned that such decisions [about carcinogenicity] are usually made at the 'frontiers of scientific knowledge.' They are. to a
significant degree, policy judgments rather than findings of fact, and they are therefore entitled to great judicial deference." Ronald Brickman. Sheila
Jasanoff & Thomas Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: The Policy of Regulation in Europe and United States. 121 (1985). For a criticism of how the
courts defer too much to administrative agencies, see Wagner, The Science Charade, 95 Colum. L. Rev. at 1664-65. n. 186.
9See, e.g., Faigman, Legal Alchemy, x (Difficulty of reconciling "uncertainties of science- with use of science in courts. administrative agencies.
legislatures) & Ziman, An introduction to Science Studies at 113. "Unfortunately, the scientist's concept of statistical error does not translate directly
into the judge's concept of legal error. We cannot say, therefore, that a study that is statistically significant at the .05 level of confidence will leadjudges, if they admit the evidence. to make only five errors (of the Type I variety [false positive]) out of one hundred. Hence, there is no true
correspondence between statistical confidence and legal burdens of proof." Faigman, Legal Alchemy. 68. Science searches for comprehensive
understanding .. .A trial seeks to resolve a focused legal dispute in a finite period of time." Foster & Huber. Judging Science at 17. Cranor
extensively discusses the differing burdens of proof in science and the law in his book. Cranor. Regulating Toxic Substances alpassim.
'0 Foster & Huber, Judging Science at 49.
101 See supra note 1.
55
MELPR, Vol. 8, No. 2
generally demands very strong evidence in support of a theory. 02 Scientific investigation often results, therefore, in not
proving anything and continuing uncertainty.
Neither science nor the law can afford, however, to ignore uncertain information in all circumstances. For
example, it was "largely a matter of conjecture what would happen if there were a major reactor accident" during the
development of nuclear power.' 04 Refusing to provide any scientific information on the dangers of a major reactor
accident because of uncertainty is, however, "an antisocial attitude, since it would effectively deny access to whatever
relevant information might have been gleaned in the course of research, however uncertain or controversial." 05 The
question is whether requiring a higher burden of proof for scientific evidence in the courtroom would better serve society
than a lower standard of proof. This requires a careful evaluation of the scientific process involved and the dangers of
error. 06 What it does not suggest is that a particular scientific or statistical imprimatur should be required for introduction
of scientific evidence in the courtroom or administrative agency. 07 This is true in analytical chemistry.
C. Can the Adversarial Process Work with Very Low Detection Levels?
Scientists often fundamentally distrust the ability of the adversarial process to work with scientific evidence.08
The inability to form a scientific consensus in a courtroom, the cultural clash between scientists trained to carefully
qualify their findings and lawyers rewarded for convincing others there is one truth,109 the precision of mathematics
compared to language"o all play legitimate roles in this distrust- The adversarial process can serve effectively, however,
in identifying and correcting errors in the detection, identification and quantification of very low levels of pollutants.
Errors inanalyzing very low levels of pollutants can occur many places in the process."' With proper
102'Reliable evidence and logical consistency are the two basic requirements for achieving such a consensus [of informed opinion]. These place a
tight constraint on new knowledge. and scientists tend to be closed-minded about claims that aren't so constrained. This occasionally causes science
to miss real knowledee for a time. as in the case of parity violation. But it helps guard against being swamped by a flood of nonexistent phenomena
that result from the egocentric tendency toward self-deception.** Cromer, Uncommon Sense at 171. The Supreme Court found that these differences
might prevent juries from learning of -authentic*' new scientific insights in order to avoid relying on "[clonjectures that are incorrect." Daubert, 509
U.S. at 596-97.
103 The uncertainty is especially high with regard to suspected carcinogens like PCBs.
Alyson C. Flourney. Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 327,
333 (1991).
04 Ziman. An Introduction to Science Studies at 179. and see also. Thomas 0. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative
Resolution ofScience Poliev Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSH4, 67 Geo. L.J. 729. 808-9 (1979).
105 id
'06 Cranor argues that justice requires that priority be given to avoiding false positives and underregulation." Cranor, Regulating Toxic Substances
at 152-153. '-In tort law we should not be so concerned to have evidence of harm from toxic torts that is scientifically defensible in the best journals
that the wrongful loss of a person's good health goes uncompensated. In administrative agencies we should not be so concerned to develop
biologically correct models for assessing each risk in question that we identify few carcinogens or assess few of the risks of those we have
identified.' Id. at 178. He is unable, however, to identify a philosophical theory that fully supports his position. See id. at 155-178. Utilitarianism,
Rawls. Daniels. and distributively sensitive consequentialism all fail because they cannot support Cranor's position. Id. Is Cranor, despite admirable
intentions and considerable insights. wrong or are utilitarianism, Rawls, Daniels. and the others wrong?
To write that there should "be no material impairment of health, to ensure that in most circumstances a person will not have to choose
between having a job or having good health." id. at 175 (emphasis added). begs the question of what "most circumstances"' means. As much as we
would like to be certain that false negatives have fewer costs than false positives, spending millions of dollars because of false positives may
adversely affect lives as much as false negatives may.107 Kumbo. 526 U.S. at 246.
'os Jasanoff. Science at the Bar at 4.
10 Scientists are not alone in their distrust of the adversarial system. *'[T]he rhetoric of absoluteness increases the likelihood of conflict and inhibits
the sort of dialogue that is increasingly important in a pluralistic society. In the common enterprise of ordering our lives together, much depends on
communication. reason-giving. and mutual understanding. Even the legal profession is beginning to question the utility and legitimacy of the
traditional adoption of extreme positions by lawyers." Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment ofPolitical Discourse, 44-45 (1991).
Nor are scientists the first. -Socrates: Now which type of persuasion does oratory produce in law courts . . . ? The one that results in being
convinced without knowing or the one that results in knowing? Georgias: It's obvious. surely. itfs the one that results in conviction.- Plato.
Georgias (Donald J. Zeyl. trans.). in Plato: Complete Works, 800 (1997).
110 See. Ziman. Reliable Knowledge at 11-13 (difference between spoken language and mathematics).
" See supra section II.
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precautions, however, dischargers can identify and respond to the possibility of errors.'" 2 Experts hired by dischargers can
challenge the interpretation of gas chromatographs and laboratory quality assurance and quality control procedures done
by administrative agencies and plaintiffs." 3 The uncertainties involved in extrapolation from animal studies to human
beings or from epidemiological studies to causes are not present. The adversarial system can handle the issues raised by
very low detection, identification and quantification levels very well.
VI. CHANGING THE REGULATORY APPROACH TO BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT WITHOUT UNFAIRLY
PENALIZING DISCHARGERS.
EPA has adopted a reasonable regulatory approach to controlling discharges of PCBs that cannot be reliably
measured by science at very low levels. Placing the issue back into context, however, supports additional
environmentally protective measures that will not unfairly penalize dischargers. First and foremost, the regulatory
approach should distinguish between violations of the quantification level and of the WQBEL. Compliance with the
WQBEL protects the environment whereas compliance with the quantification level does not necessarily protect the
environment.114 If an analyst is certain that the discharge sample violates the WQBEL with a high degree of confidence,
then uncertainty about how much it violates the WQBEL and the exact amount of PCBs in the sample become relatively
unimportant. The environment is being harmed contrary to the statutory mandate.
Confidence intervals provide this type of information better than do significance tests."5 Confidence intervals do
so by providing a range of values to use for comparison purposes" 6 instead of a single value. The range of a confidence
interval may be very broad and yet still exceed the WQBEL at the lowest point of the range. This would support a
violation. Conversely if the WQBEL is within the confidence interval or no confidence interval can be drawn, then a
court should examine other evidence more closely before determining that a violation exists.'
Second, the regulatory approach should distinguish between discharges to waters whose uses are already impaired
by PCBs and discharges to waters whose uses are not impaired within the meaning of the Clean Water Act. EPA
regulations prohibit discharges that "cause or contribute" to the violation of water quality standards."' 8 Finding.PCBs at
the "detection level" means that the discharger is putting PCBs into waters that already have too many PCBs. The
ecosystem will have to cleanse itself of that many more PCBs thereby increasing the danger from a false negative
increases. The danger from a false positive remains the same. This change in balance supports placing the burden on a
discharger to show that the WQBEL is not being violated when PCBs are found at the detection level.'"9 The industrial
discharger can take precautions when the samples are taken, take additional samples, evaluate and test internal waste or
process streams, or show how its PMP prevents a violation to mee its blirden.10
112 Koorse, False Positives, 19 Env L. Rev. at 10220-22 (detailed advice to dischargers on how to reduce and protect themselves from uncertainty)
and David Faigman, Elise Porter, & Michael Saks, Check Your Cystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the past, Understanding the
Present, and Worrying about the Future ofScientific Evidence, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1799. 1834 (1994). (provides a list of how to assure accurate data
including the credentials and experience of the technician, specifics of data collection, general reputation and track record of the laboratory'that
produced the data, specifics of any sample collection, the extent to which the technique relies on the interpretation of an 'expert."')113 See supra note 109.
114 See supra note 15.
115 A result at the quantification level should, of course, be a violation.116 "They should focus on P-values (or better yet interval estimates) and they should concern themselves with the reasonableness of the underlving
probability model that gives rise to these numbers" and not force into a "poorly conceived and ill-defined mold of a standard deviation analysis."
D.H. Kaye at 26 Jurimetrics Journal at 223 (about employment statistics).
117 One court has rejected the use of confidence intervals to defeat an allegation of violation because the Clean Water Act requires dischargers to
submit accurate information. US v. Aluminum Company ofAmerica, 824 F.Supp. 640. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1993). "To the extent that a permit holder
hires a laboratory that produces inaccurate and unreliable test results, the permit holder has failed to fulfill its monitoring requirement in direct
violation of the Act. Erroneous laboratory results yield the same result as if no monitoring had been performed at all: the government. citizen-
plaintiffs. and the courts have no way of knowing whether discharge violations have occurred or not." Public Interest Research Group ofNew
Jersey. Inc v ELF Atochem North America, 817 F. Supp. 1164, 1179 (D.N.J. 1993). Such a rigid approach might lessen the burdenson courts and
administrative agencies in the short run, but in the long run will probably not result in better data. Dischargers may simply report the same data
differently in order to avoid foreclosing their options.
"' 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i).
119 This is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A (1963) (burden of proof is on joint torfeasors of indistinguishable harm).
Allocation of the burden of proof is "often decisive" in these contexts. Flourney, Legislating Inaction, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. at 384.120 See supra section IV.
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Third, the regulatory approach and courts should consider evidence about base rates in determining the level of
statistical confidence necessary for finding that a sample violates the WQBEL. If a discharger has a history of numerous
discharges violating the WQBEL, then the practical danger of false positives recedes and that of false negatives
advances. '2 Conversely, if the discharger has a history of compliance, then more statistical confidence might be required
for finding a violation based solely on one sample.
CONCLUSION
Even in the hard science of measurement there are difficult policy choices that science alone cannot resolve.' 22
EPA has made one reasonable choice but other choices are both environmentally protective and fair to dischargers. The
threat of these choices being labeled "junk science should not dissuade EPA from adopting them.
121 See KaYe. -Reference Manual on Statistics." Reference Manual at 386-7 & Michael 0. Finkelstein & Bruce Levin, Statistics for Lawyers 94
(1990) (review of the discussion about using Baye's Theorem in evidence) & Michael 0. Finkelstein and William B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach
to Identification Evidence, 83 Hary. L. Rev. 489 (1970) (which started the discussion).
122 "The decision to accept or reject a hypothesis on the basis of statistical considerations requires judgment. which, to a lay observer, may be
obscured by the apparent precision of the analysis.... And where the line [between 'significant' and 'not significant'] lies is not a scientific matter at
all . . . nor does it describe the magnitude of the effect or the uncertainties in the measurement." Foster and Huber, Judging Science at 78.
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